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NOTE
A DANGEROUS DISCRETIONARY "DUTY": U.S.
ANTIDUMPING POLICY TOWARD CHINA
I.

INTRODUCTION

In an era of flourishing transitions from state controlled policies and
economies to democratic governance, the United States foreign trade
policy, particularly toward emerging market-oriented countries, may
require adjustment to maintain the credibility of the United States as an
important player in the trade scene and to prevent alienation of the new
markets. Numerous countries that once subscribed to government
control of their economies have been edging away from state control in
the private sector and have opened their markets to foreign trade and
investment.' Recognizing the benefits of trading in new markets, the
United States has taken measures to encourage these countries to enter
into agreements that further liberalize their trade activities.2

1. See Robert H. Lantz, The Searchfor Consistency: Treatment of Nonmarket Economies in
Transition Under United States Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Laws, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 993, 993 (1995); see also Luke P. Bellocchi, The Effects of and Trends in Executive Policy
and Court of International Trade (CIT) Decisions Concerning Antidumping and the Non-Market
Economy (NME) of the People's Republic of China, 10 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 177, 177 (1997) ("The
world economy's change over the last decade has caused communist nonmarket economy (NME)
countries to abandon their socialist experiment and reform their economies into free market
enterprises.").
2. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
InternationalLaw, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 374 (2000). The United States encouraged the World
Trade Organization to admit China as a member of the trade organization, arguing that the accession
would be a
means of opening an enormous market to U.S. exporters, of promoting faster growth in
productivity and wages in China (and thus higher demand for U.S. products), and of
providing a catalyst for the broad economic and institutional change in China necessary
for it to be an open, stable and, prosperous observer of global norms ....
Id.; see also Brad L. Bacon, The People's Republic of China and the World Trade Organization:
Anticipating a United States Congressional Dilemma, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 369, 388-89
(2000) (noting that the new open market would offer a growing export market for American
companies in goods and services and increased foreign direct investment possibilities).
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At the same time however, such trade agreements and the resulting
open movement of goods into the United States may have an injurious
effect on U.S. industries. Domestic companies may not be able to
compete with the foreign goods where the imports are available to the
U.S. consumer at a much lower price than the domestic version. As a
result, the United States has maintained certain trade regulations and
remedies such as antidumping duties to protect domestic industries
against the influx of foreign goods that are injuring that particular
industry.3 If the price at which the foreign producer is selling its product
within the United States is much lower than the price charged in the
foreign market, or is below the cost of producing the product, the U.S.
antidumping regime may apply.4 In such a case, in order to rectify the
injury that domestic producers are suffering from lost sales due to
cheaper imports, the U.S. government places a tariff on the import, in
order to make the domestic products more competitive with the cheaper
foreign imports. The foreign company is responsible for paying the
tariff, and the tariff cannot be avoided because the duties assessed by the
United States Department of Commerce ("Commerce") are not subject
to override by any other government branch. 5
The tariff imposed by Commerce is determined by the difference in
price of the good in its home market and the price for which it sells in
the United States. 6 Thus, the greater the difference, as a result of a low
calculated foreign market price, the higher the tariff that will be applied.
The procedure for calculating the foreign market price of the product
under investigation depends on the extent of government control over
the economy from which the product originates.7 For products imported
from nonmarket economies ("NME")--countries that maintain a degree
of government control over the economy8 -- Commerce must collect and

3. See Bellocchi, supra note 1, at 177 ("The United States administration and Congress have
implemented policies to encourage the transformation of NMEs to market economies while still
maintaining a safe channel to challenge the access of dumped products into [its] markets.").
4. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2005).
5. Peter D. Ehrenhaft & Charlotte G. Meriwether, The Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Small
Aidfor Trade?, 58TUL. L.REV. 1107,1111 (1984).
6. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (2005).
7. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (2005).

8. Nonmarket economies do not operate by the same supply-demand principle of free market
economies because they maintain a certain degree of government control within the market. These
tend to be the post-communist countries. Alford suggests that the U.S. antidumping law reflects the
level of government intervention that the United States deems acceptable, which would not be in
accord with communist or post communist countries. See William P. Alford, When is China
Paraguay?An Examinationof the Application of the Antidumping and CountervailingDuty Laws of
the United States to China and Other "Nonmarket Economy " Nations, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 130
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assess considerably more data than for products from free-market
economies because the foreign market price is distorted by nonmarket
influences and must be adjusted.
Commerce has wide discretion in choosing the data upon which it
will base its calculations of the foreign market price from all of the
information collected. 9 Where Commerce desires to establish more
protection for a particular domestic industry or against goods from a
particular region, it can do so by choosing to calculate the tariff based on
data that results in a low foreign market price, as long as the choice of
data is reasonably explained.' The danger in the discretion granted
arises where Commerce has an incentive to adopt policies that protect its
own industries over competing foreign firms. The protection has been
particularly targeted against those firms located in the People's Republic
of China, given the recent trend in viewing China as the new
superpower, and, therefore, a threat to the United States economically."
The resulting imposition of antidumping duties is often viewed as a
political and commercial weapon for U.S. industries seeking broader
2
protection measures, rather than as a method to prevent dumping.'
Many free market economists maintain that because the laws are
intended to protect markets they should be eliminated.' 3 China, however,
is subject to antidumping duties under the NME rubric for the next
fifteen years despite its progressive transition toward an economy
functioning according to market principles. Given the strong remedy as a
result of the administration's or Congress's inability to override the
duties assessed against a foreign industry, domestic producers injured by
foreign imports pressure their government officials to maintain and place
(1987). Thus, the risk is posed "of establishing criteria that discriminate against certain nations for
activity... that fail to treat comparable behavior in different foreign economies in the same fashion,
and that unreflectively penalize vital domestic policy decisions of foreign sovereigns." Id. at 129.
9. Lasko Metal Prods., Inc. v. U.S. Durable Elec. Metal Factory, Ltd., 43 F.3d 1442, 1446
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
10. See id. (citing Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660,
665 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); see also Union Camp Corp. v. United States, 22 Ct. Int'l Trade 267, 269 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1998).
11. The main concerns underlying U.S. relations with China include a growing trade deficit
and fears of Chinese nuclear proliferation. See Bacon, supra note 2, at 370. One way to meet and
curb China's desire for equality with the global economic superpowers was to make it a WTO
member, making it more interconnected with other major trading partners. See generally Jeremy
Brooks Rosen, Note, China, Emerging Economies, and the World Trade Order,46 DUKE L.J. 1519,
1547-50 (1997).
12. See Ehrenhaft & Meriwether, supra note 5, at 1112.
13. See Bellocchi, supra note 1, at 180 (explaining that many free market economists criticize
the antidumping laws because they claim that many of the dumping cases brought for review have
little to do with free-market disruption concerns).
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"more trade
remedies under the antidumping or countervailing duty
14
rubric."'
The U.S. antidumping rubric is left open to criticism not only due
to the protectionist policies it can foster, but also because of its
unpredictability and lack of accuracy. Under the antidumping regime for
NME countries, Commerce must use the best available information to
calculate data used in the tariff determination.1 5 The agency has the
discretion to use the information supplied by the company or to use data
it has accumulated through its own investigation, should it determine16
that the supplied information is unreliable, withheld, or unverifiable.
The statute, however, does not specify the factors that would make the
data unreliable and therefore subject to rejection. In addition, while the
"facts otherwise available," to which Commerce resorts in such
instances 17 must be the best available, 8 neither statute delineates the
factors Commerce should consider in choosing alternative data.' 9 As a
result, Commerce in various investigations has rejected information
supplied as insufficient, unrepresentative, or outside of the period of
investigation. However, in other circumstances, Commerce has accepted
information with the same inadequacies. The investigated company may
not know which information it can rely on in valuing its products as it
will not know on which information Commerce will depend,
propounding the negative results of the calculation's unpredictability.
The "best available information" standard also raises questions of
accuracy because where the data chosen by Commerce is significantly
removed from the actual value, the assessment becomes more
imprecise. 20 This inaccuracy, as a result of the data chosen, leaves the
U.S. antidumping policy open to even more criticism than it has already

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Ehrenhaft & Meriwether, supra note 5, at 1111-12.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1)(b) (2005).
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a) (2005).
19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2)(D) (2005).
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1)(b) (2005).
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (2005); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677e (2005).

20.

See Sanghan Wang, U.S. Trade Laws Concerning Nonmarket Economies Revisitedfor

Fairness and Consistency, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 593, 620-22 (1996). The regime leads to
inaccuracy because the substituted values represent the price of factors in a country which does not
share exactly the same environment:
The use of a surrogate's values necessarily will neuter the nonmarket economy's
comparative advantage and replace it with the comparative advantage of the surrogate.
While this may yield either a lower or higher price than what ought to be the price of the
nonmarket economy, it is necessarily a process fraught with inaccuracy.
Id. at 622.
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faced, 2 1 because the purpose of the antidumping statute is to determine
margins between the foreign market price and the domestic U.S. price as
"accurately as possible., 22 In light of recent market reforms 23 and
economic and global trends, the antidumping regime, as part of a
framework to liberalize trade, raises questions concerning its adequacy
as applied to imports from economies in transition.24 These questions
arise because, in the end, the free flow of imported goods from the
emerging countries is hampered.25
The Court of International Trade serves as a check on the
antidumping decisions of Commerce in its investigations and assessment
of duties. Companies unsatisfied with the tariff may appeal Commerce's
decision. Nevertheless, the Court's review is limited. If Commerce's
decision to reject the supplied information and to rely instead on its own
collected data is reasonable, Commerce's decision must stand.
This Note will consider the discretion afforded Commerce with
respect to its choice of data upon which its calculations of antidumping
duties for products from NME countries are based, particularly the
People's Republic of China, given China's industry expansion and
abandonment of strict government market controls.2 6 While China's
trade with numerous partners has grown since it has opened its borders,2 7
the liberal policies have led to numerous antidumping complaints filed
by China's trading partners.2 8 Part II of this Note will discuss the need
for antidumping duties and outline the U.S. regulatory scheme. Part II
will conclude with the difficulties of calculating and administering
21. See Charlene Barshefsky, Non-Market Economies in Transition and the US Antidumping
Law: Remarks on the Need for Reevaluation, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 373, 375 (1990).
22. Lasko Metal Prods., Inc. v. U.S. Durable Elec. Metal Factory, Ltd., 43 F.3d 1442, 1446
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1185, 1191 (Fed. Cir.
1990)).
23. China has adopted legislative measures that lessened government control over industry.
See Is China Playing by the Rules? Free Trade, Fair Trade, and WTO Compliance. Hearing Before
the Congressional-Executive Comm. on China, 108th Cong. 5 (2003). While the transition is not
complete, "[e]conomic and financial reforms have introduced market forces into China, and
privileges accorded state-owned firms are gradually being removed." Fair or Foul: The Challenge
of Negotiating, Monitoring and Enforcing U.S. Trade Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of Gov't Mgmt., the Fed Workforce and the Dist. Of Columbia of the S. Comm. on
GovernmentalAffairs, 108th Cong. 61-62 (2003) [hereinafter Fairor Foul].
24. Ehrenhaft & Meriwether, supra note 5, at 1111.
25. See Fair or Foul, supra note 23, at 95.
26. "[M]uch of the litigation and dispute concerning [antidumping] rules has come in cases
involving the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) due to its curious status as an NME country in
transition ....Bellocchi, supra note 1, at 177.
27. Lei Yu, Note, Rule of Law or Rule of Protectionism: Anti-Dumping Practices Toward
China and the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 293, 298 (2002).
28. Id.
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antidumping duties for products imported from NMEs. Part III will
discuss the statutory standard Commerce must use in choosing data to
calculate values and the resulting duties, and will also analyze the
standard as applied in several recent antidumping actions. In turn, Part
III will address the effects of the standard and Commerce's adoption of
protectionist policies in light of viewing China as a new threat to the
U.S. economy and will conclude with an exploration into the validity of
such predictions. Last, Part IV will touch upon the effects and
implications of moving toward a protectionist policy and possible
solutions to address concerns of NME exporters.
II.

DUMPING REASONS, EFFECTS, AND PROTECTIONS

Where merchandise is sold at a price below that for which it sells in
its own country, the merchandise is dumped in a foreign market. 29 Thus,
fences produced and then sold in China for 5 dollars, but sold in the
United States for only two dollars, may be considered "dumped" on the
U.S. market. The lower price may be explained by the exporter's desire
to monopolize the receiving markets by selling its merchandise at a
lower price in those markets. 30 The lower priced imports, more
competitive than their domestic counterparts, result in injured domestic
industries. 31 To prevent imported products from dilapidating the
domestic industries that manufacture the same products, countries have
devised rules against dumping. 32 These rules, intended to offset the
effect of dumped merchandise on the domestic market,33 vary depending
on the country from which the product originates and consider the
various production factors and production costs of the merchandise.3 4
A.

Purposeand Effect of Dumping

Dumping occurs where merchandise is sold at less than its fair
market value. Comparing the normal value of the merchandise and its
export price, the merchandise is dumped on the United States if the price
at which the merchandise is sold is less than the product's normal

29. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (2005).
30. See Bellocchi, supra note 1, at 180.
31. See Ehrenhaft & Meriwhether, supra note 5, at 1116-17; see also Lantz, supra note 1, at
998.
32. Terence P. Stewart, U.S.-Japan Economic Disputes: The Role of Antidumping and
CountervailingDuty Laws, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 689, 696 (1999).
33. See Ehrenhaft & Meriwether, supra note 5, at 1117.
34. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (2005).
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value. 35 There are numerous reasons companies sell their merchandise
abroad at a lower price.36 Certain reasons are acceptable to the receiving
country, for example, taking "advantage of a protected home market to
increase profits by unloading excess capacity abroad above marginal
costs;
and
profit
maximization
through
cross-product
subsidization . ... ,,37 However, other motives for dumping merchandise,
such as market domination and predatory pricing, are intolerable and the
offending action becomes subject to the receiving market's antidumping
regime. 38
Expansion and domination of market share are not merely sideeffects of dumping, but are often the result of a planned export-oriented
policy. 39 Setting predatory prices, foreign firms and exporters enter
markets by shipping and selling at unfairly low prices in an attempt to
drive local competitors out of business or to gain a large market share.4 °
Thus, the company can accumulate monopoly or oligopoly power by
selling goods at a low price, gaining market share, and then raising the
price. 4 1 To counteract predatory price discrimination by exporters,
antidumping rules and penalties are necessary to thwart monopolies.42
Due to its injurious effects upon domestic business and production,
dumping is a major aspect of unfair trading practice in trade relations.4 3
"Since the early 1900's, the United States has acted to prevent the
dumping of goods on the U.S. market., 44 Given the increasing
liberalization of trade, domestic producers have been increasingly forced
to compete with foreign producers in American markets. This
competition has long been scrutinized in the United States.4 5
35. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1677b(a) (2005). This price discrimination is a result of the
manufacturer, operating under conditions where markets are separable, selling comparable products
in different markets at different prices. Lantz, supra note 1, at 997.
36. Such selling of the product below its manufacturing cost may be supported, either directly
or indirectly, by the "producers' governments in an effort to develop an industrial infrastructure [in
its own country] through growth in exported goods." Stewart, supranote 32, at 698.
37. Id. at 697.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 698.
40. Christopher F. Corr, Trade Protection in the New Millennium: The Ascendancy of
Antidumping Measures, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 49, 98 (1997).
41.

Id.

42. Id. However, the antitrust rules are also in effect to stop monopolies.
43. See generally Jane A. Restani, An Introduction to Statutory Responses to Import
Penetration, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1087 (1986).

44. Id.
45. See Alexander W. Sierck, Trade Policy Harmonization: Too Much of a Good Thing? 18
MICH. J. INT'L L. 713, 723 (1997) (reviewing JAGDISH N. BHAGWATi & ROBERT E. HUDEC, FAIR
TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? (1996)).
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Antidumping laws, statutorily based under Title VII of the Tariff Act of
that trade practices be
1930,46 resulted from this scrutiny, requiring
47
manner.
equitable
and
fair
a
in
conducted
In addition to monopolistic effects, dumping also distorts resource
allocation, resulting in weakened companies and job loss for reasons
other than comparative advantage.4 8 Dumping sends false market signals
regarding the competitiveness of a business and whether others should
"enter, exit, or expand in business.' 49 Where imports are sold for less
than that which the domestic producers can sell comparable products,
those seeking to enter the industry will conclude that they cannot enter
the market and compete effectively, and those already in the industry
may decide to exit.50
Notwithstanding the damage to domestic industry, the individual
domestic consumer benefits as a result of the lower export prices. While
consumers of the importing country realize a gain in the form of lower
prices, the gain, however, is at the expense of the consumers of the
exporting country who pay inflated prices.51 Moreover, the benefit to
consumers in the importing country, arguably, will likely be short lived
due to an increase in prices as a result of the company monopolizing the
industry, company inefficiency, or antitrust investigations.5 2 Thus,
despite potential consumer benefits of low prices, the antidumping laws
"reflect an international political judgment that sustained transnational
price discrimination ought to be deterred" and remedied.53 Antidumping
provisions permit the government, where industries are harmed by
international price discrimination, "to restore rational market signals by

The controversies over what does and does not constitute anti-competitive behavior in
international trade presents, at least to the business and labor communities, one of the
most impassioned manifestations of the "fairness" debates. The fundamental concern is
that low-priced products from domestic or foreign sources have the potential to drive
incumbent producers out of business.
Id.
46. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
47. Stewart, supra note 32, at 696.
48. Id. at 694-97.
49. Id. at 694.
50. Id. at 695-96. Domestic producers can, however, remedy such bad business decisions by
carefully evaluating "market conditions to be sure that corporate decisions flow from underlying
economic realities and not from false market signals." Id. at 697.
51. ld. at 696.
52. See id.
53. Sierck, supra note 45, at 723-24.
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neutralizing the price discrimination, ' 4 and permit the imported and
domestic goods to compete at a fair price.5 5
B. PreventingDumping Through Antidumping Regime
Given the monopolistic, injurious, and distortive effects of
dumping, the United States has implemented statutes consistent with
international agreements regulating dumping. 56 "The specific provisions
of United States AD [antidumping] statutes reflect Congress' intent to
enforce the AD statutes through a [dual agency] system in which
Commerce determines the amount of dumping, if any, and the ITC
[International Trade Commission] determines whether the dumping
harms a United States industry., 57 Generally, a domestic firm or industry
proposes that the U.S. government initiate a dumping investigation
against a foreign firm whose low priced imports are injuring the
domestic industry.58 Initially, ITC investigation determines whether the
dumping caused, or threatens to cause, material injury to the U.S.
industry. 59 If the product is sold below normal value and such sales were
the cause of injury to a domestic industry, Commerce places a tax-an
antidumping duty--on the imported product. Commerce establishes the
duty based on the dumping margin by calculating the average amount by
which the fair market value of the product exceeds the price of the
product in the United States.60
1. Fair Market Value Calculations for Market Economy Products
To determine the dumping margin, the fair market value of the
product must first be calculated. The calculation of the fair market value
of a product depends on the categorization of the country from which the
product is exported. 6' The exporting countries are categorized as having
either a market economy or an NME.62 The main difference between the
treatment of countries with market economies and NMEs is the method
for determining whether dumping exists and the calculation of the

54. Stewart, supra note 32, at 696.
55. See Restani, supra note 43, at 1088.
56. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (2005).
57.

58.
whether
59.
60.
61.
62.

See Lantz, supra note 1, at 1000-01.

19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a)(I) (2005). Commerce can also initiate an investigation to determine
dumping is occurring. Id.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (2005).
See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(1)(A) (2005).
See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (2005).
See id.
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duty.63 For a product originating from a market economy, Commerce
employs a standard methodology for determining a product's fair market
value. 64 The fair market value is equal to the price at which the product
is sold in the firm's domestic market, after accounting for differences in
sales conditions and merchandise characteristics. 65 If the product is not
sold in the foreign firm's domestic market, the fair market value
becomes the price at which the product is sold in countries other than the
United States.66

2. Fair Market Value Calculation for Products from NMEs
For NME countries, the process of calculating the fair market value
of the product is more difficult. The price at which the product sells is
not the product's value because the resources used in the production of
the good are not allocated according to market concepts of supply and
demand, but rather by some other criteria set by the government.6 7 The
set prices usually reflect political, economic, or bureaucratic factors
because of the intervention of the government.6 8 The intervention,
Commerce presumes, may lead to wholesale subsidization of various
sectors of the economy. 69 As a result of intervening nonmarket
principles, prices of goods are subject to discrepancies that distort their
value.7 ° While the normal value of goods from a market economy is the
price at which the foreign product is sold in the exporting country, 71 the
value of the good from a NME country is equal to the manufacturer's
cost of producing the product.72 To account for the distortion in prices of
factors entailed in production, the producer's costs reflect the values that
would prevail if such prices were determined by market forces.73
Therefore, the normal value is not based on the home market prices of

63. See id.
64. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2005).
65.

See id.

66. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B) (2005) (stating that Commerce may look at sales in third
countries if sales in the firm's domestic market are too small for comparison). If there are no sales in
the home market or third countries, Commerce utilizes a "constructed value." See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(e)(l) (2005).
67. Lantz, supra note 1, at 1002.
68. Gary N. Horlick & Shannon S. Shuman, Nonmarket Economy Trade and U.S.
Antidumping/CountervailingDuty Laws, 18 INT'L LAW. 807, 818 (1984).
69. Bellocchi, supra note 1, at 185.
70. Magnesium Corp. v. United States, 20 Ct. Int'l Trade 1092 (1996).
71. Shakeproof Assembly Components Div. of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. United States, 268
F.3d 1376, 1379 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2001); 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2005).
72. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (2005).
73. Union Camp Corp. v. United States, 22 Ct. Int'l Trade 267, 270 (1998).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol34/iss2/9

10

Piskorski: A Dangerous Discretionary "Duty": U.S. Antidumping Policy Toward
U.S. ANTIDUMPING POLICY

2005]

production factors,74 but on the market values of such factors within a
surrogate country.

a.

Determining NMEs

The statute guiding Commerce's determination of whether a
country is considered an NME country, or its decision as to the proper
country from which to obtain surrogate prices and surrogate factors of
production, affords wide discretion to the administration.75 Commerce
determines whether a country has a NME by utilizing several factors.76
The administration considers the extent to which the country's currency
is convertible, whether its wage rates are determined by free bargaining
between labor and management, whether investments are permitted, and
the extent of government ownership and control over resources and
prices. 77 China has been considered an NME for a long time, and as a
result is subjected to "various treatments using surrogates under
antidumping laws in the United States., 78 Under the 2001 Agreement
underlying China's ascension to the World Trade Organization
("WTO"), the ITC may treat China as a NME for fifteen years for the
purpose of establishing whether exporters are dumping goods.79
b.

Determining Surrogate Countries and Values

If the product under investigation originates from a NME country,
and fair market value cannot be based on home market price, then the
calculation of fair market value must be calculated based on a surrogate
country's value of the factors of production utilized in producing the

74. Berd G. Janzen, InternationalTrade Decisions of the Federal Circuit: Three Years of
RigorousReview, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1102 (2003).
75. Bellocchi, supra note 1,at 186.
76. "While, as a practical matter, NME countries have traditionally been equated with
Communist countries, this bright line is fading, demanding a harder look at the economic
characteristics displayed by these nations." Barshefsky, supra note 21, at 376.
77. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18) (2005).
78. Bellocchi, supra note 1, at 186. As early as 1986, Commerce has acknowledged that
China has undergone substantial economic reform, including a rise in industries where inputs and
outputs were not subject to government control. Petroleum Wax Candles from the People's
Republic of China, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,085 (Dep't of Commerce July 10, 1986). In 1989, Commerce
determined that while national trading companies and factories had become autonomous, China was
not sufficiently market oriented to justify different treatment. Headwear from People's Republic of
China, 54 Fed. Reg. 11,983 (Dep't of Commerce Mar. 23, 1989).
79. World Trade Organization, Accession of the People's Republic of China, Decision of 10
November 2001, WT/L/432, at 9 (2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/acc-e/
completeacc-e.htm.
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merchandise. 80 Factors of production include labor hours, raw materials,
energy and other utilities, and representative capital costs including
depreciations. 8' General expenses, profit amount, and the cost of
containers, coverings, and other expenses are added to the surrogate

80. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(2). If Commerce finds that information is inadequate to base fair
market value on value of factors of production then it calculates the fair market value on the basis of
price at which comparable merchandise produced in a market economy country is sold in other
countries. Id. Another methodology Commerce may apply in determining a product's fair market
value is a "countrywide NME antidumping rate[] unless individual exporters [can] demonstrate
legal, financial, and economic independence from the NME government." Janzen, supra note 74, at
1104. "The rationale for this single dumping margin is that, in a centrally planned economy, the
state may redirect goods and production through a company that has received the lowest
antidumping margin." Joseph A. Laroski, Jr., NMES: A Love Story Nonmarket and Market Economy
Status Under U.S. Antidumping Law, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 369, 376 (1999).
The NME presumption begins with the assumption that the producers are part of the NME
entity until they prove otherwise. See Transcom, Inc. v. United States, 24 Ct. Int'l. Trade 1253,
1266 n. It (2000). The country must prove that government interference in setting the price and
volume of the merchandise in question to be produced must be nearly nonexistent. Chrome-Plated
Lug Nuts From the People's Republic of China, 57 Fed. Reg. 15,052 (Dep't of Commerce Apr. 24,
1992). Also, private or collective ownership must characterize the entire industry in question, rather
than just the producer. Id. Finally, market determined prices must be paid for all material and nonmaterial inputs. Id. "A manufacturer operating in an industry failing to meet these conditions will
have [fair market value] calculated under the factors of production approach utilizing surrogate
country costs." Lantz, supra note 1, at 1043. Even if Commerce finds that these factors have been
met and that the normal method of determining fair market value should be used, it will only do so
if there is enough available information to allow the calculation of fair market value. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677b(c)(1)(B)-(2) (2005). The market oriented industry approach is difficult to attain because a
manufacturer must rebut Commerce's presumption by proving a negative; that no government
control exists. Lantz, supra note 1, at 1042. The difficulty lies in insulating the industrial sectors in a
NME from the macroeconomic effects of government control. Lawrence J. Bogard & Linda C.
Menghetti, The Treatment of Non-Market Economies Under U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Law: A Petitioner'sPerspective, 789 PLI/CoRP. 217, 244 (1992). Thus "Commerce will likely
never find that such significant production inputs as labor, rent, utilities, and elements of factory
overhead are acquired at market-driven prices." Id.
Commerce relies on the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
("MOFTEC") to identify all exporters of the merchandise and to submit a consolidated
questionnaire response for those exporters. See, e.g., Sebacic Acid From the People's Republic of
China, 59 Fed. Reg. 565, 567 (Dep't of Commerce Jan. 5, 1994). Ifany of the Chinese exporters fail
to respond, the response is considered incomplete resulting in nationwide margins based on best
available information. See id. Because it is difficult for the Chinese government to persuade all the
exporters of the same merchandise to respond, Chinese exporters often receive nationwide margins
based on the best available information. See Leonard E. Santos & Thomas Vakerics, Chinese
Imports Face Tough Anti-Dumping Rules, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 19, 1994, at C13. Furthermore,
unilateral duties may be assessed against each exporter of the goods within the industry even if such
individual exporters were not specifically listed in Commerce's findings. See Transcom, 24 Ct. Int'l.
Trade at 1257-65. Suppliers within the industry have an affirmative duty to prove that their products
should receive a lower rate than the unilateral assessed rate. Id. at 1266 n. 11. Thus companies that
import goods subject to an antidumping duty will have to monitor notices of reviews for those
goods in order to try to receive a lower antidumping rate for those goods. See id. at 1257-65.
81. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(3).
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values for the factors of production.82 The factors of production used to
manufacture the goods and their prices reflect the values of such factors
in a market economy country or countries considered appropriate. 3 The
Secretary of Commerce chooses a surrogate country that is comparable
to that of the home market country in per capita gross national product
and infrastructure development.8 4 To the extent possible, the surrogate
country is at a level of economic development comparable to the NME
country and has significant producers of comparable merchandise. 85 If
there is no surrogate market economy country with comparable
development producing the same product, Commerce bases its analysis
on a surrogate country that produces a product that is comparable and
substantially similar to the subject merchandise.8 6 While the statute gives
equal weight to economic comparability and merchandise comparability,
Commerce weighs economic comparability more heavily. 87 Otherwise,
Commerce calculates the value of the product by using factors of
production from market economy surrogate countries of comparable
development on a case-by-case basis. And as a last resort, where
complete data is unavailable from a single country, Commerce fills 88in
data missing from a primary surrogate with data from other surrogates.
The choice of a surrogate in an antidumping investigation is easily
justified when both per capita gross national product ("GNP") and
infrastructure development are similar among the NME and the
surrogate country. 89 "Similar per capita GNP indicates that the surrogate
country production capacity and wage rates reflect what the market rate

82. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(l)(B).
83. Shakeproof Assembly Components Div. of Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. United States, 268
F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2001); 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1)(B) (2005).
84. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.408 (2006).
85. Peer Bearing Co. v. United States, 25 Ct. Int'l Trade 1199, 1208 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001); 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4) (2005).
86. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(B) (2005).
87. Bellocchi, supra note 1,at 201.
88. See Sparklers From the People's Republic of China, 56 Fed. Reg. 20,588, 20,590 (Dep't
of Commerce May 6, 1991). Procedural obstacles exist which make it difficult to receive complete
data from one surrogate country. Not only must the United States. first receive the approval of the
foreign government to seek information of the foreign producers' confidential business, but the
producers themselves must be willing to provide the data requested. See Horlick & Shuman, supra
note 68, at 821. Producers are often unwilling, however, to provide such information because
producers then "expose themselves to high risk and expense and receive little benefit in return for
their cooperation. The risk is that Commerce may use the surrogate producer's information against
it in a later antidumping proceeding." Grace M. Kang, Solving the Nonmarket Economy Dumping
Dilemma, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 705, 714 (1987).
89. Bellocchi, supra note 1,at 202.
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in [an NME] would be if it were a market economy." 90 The law and
regulations, however, do not indicate how to measure gross national
product. 91 As a result, Commerce relies on World Bank figures, despite
warnings from the organization that the data is not reliable for such
comparisons.92 Likewise, while the "similarity in infrastructure indicates
the production capacity of the country and the capacity to engage in
external trade, 9 3 the regulations do not indicate what aspects of
economic structure are important. 94 Commerce is thus left to decide each
case anew when the NME country and its surrogate share certain
characteristics but not others. 95
Despite attempts to use costs from similarly situated economies, the
costs are usually not transferable from one country to another, 96 because
the surrogate country is likely to be "at a substantially higher level of
97
economic development than the non-market economy" in question.
Using a surrogate produces a determination based on data of an inflated
normal value, 98 resulting in a higher cost of production value and in turn
a larger duty margin. In addition, calculating the surrogate values of
factors of production requires comparing material and labor between two
countries, relying upon prices that are economically meaningless in the
NME country. 99 Propounding the resulting inaccuracy even further is the

NME exchange rates preventing the conversion of prices to a meaningful
dollar value. 00
Furthermore, because each nation has a comparative advantage in
some factor of production, using a surrogate for NME fails to account
for the possibility that the NME producer possesses significant
advantages in production and sales that the surrogate producer does
not. 10 1 "Manufacturers tend to use more of the factors of production they

90. Id.

91. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.408 (2006).
92. THE WORLD BANK, 1980 WORLD BANK ATLAS 16 n.3 (1980).
93. Bellocchi, supra note 1, at 202.
94. Alford, supra note 8, at 91.
95. Id.
96. Lantz, supra note 1, at 1007.
97. Edwin A. Vermulst, The Anti-Dumping Systems of Australia, Canada, the EEC and the
United States ofAmerica: Have Anti-Dumping Laws Become a Problem in InternationalTrade?, 10
MICH. J. INT'L L. 765, 789 (1989).
98. Id.
99. Robert Franklin Hoyt, Note, Implementation and Policy: Problems in the Application of
Countervailing Duty Laws to Nonmarket Economy Countries, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1647, 1658
(1988).
100. Id. at 1657.
101. Vernulst, supra note 97, at 789-90.
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have in abundance, with a relatively lower cost, and less of [the] scarce
factors carrying a relatively higher cost. 10° 2 Thus, factors of production
used by the manufacturer from a NME country, combined with the costs
for the factors from a surrogate market country that has a different cost
structure, produces higher dumping margins than would be assessed for
a manufacturer from a market economy country. 10 3 While constructing a
normal value for a producer in a NME country is a "difficult" and
"imprecise" process, 10 4 Congress is willing to tolerate a level of
inaccuracy 05 in order to impose a free-market principle on NME
countries. 1
III.

CONGRESS'S DISCRETIONARY SELECTION OF DATA AND
EXTERNAL EFFECTS

In order to calculate the dumping margin, not only must Commerce
choose the country that will serve as the surrogate, but it must also
determine the factors used by the producer in manufacturing the good as
well as the value of those factors. 10 6 The values, and hence the margin,
must be calculated as accurately as possible to assess an antidumping
duty. 107 Accuracy is necessary because the "duty is not intended to
punish the foreign firm; rather, it is intended to deter the foreign firm
from continuing its dumping practices."' 8 Since the purpose of
antidumping provisions is to restore market signals and calculate
accurate margins, the best available information is used to value the
factors utilized by the producer of the good.
The information provided in the party's questionnaire responses
serves as the basis for best available information where Commerce
determines that the information provided is in fact the best available and
the information relates to prices and values in the surrogate country. 0 9
In order to calculate margins as accurately as possible, interested parties
must provide Commerce with "accurate, credible, and verifiable

102. Lantz, supra note 1, at 1007.
103. Id. at 1008.
104. Shakeproof Assembly Components Div. of I11.Tool Works, Inc. v. United States, 268
F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (sustaining Commerce's methodology for valuing steel wire rod,
based on certain actual purchases of steel wire rod made by PRC producer from a British company).
105. Hoyt, supra note 99, at 1652.
106. ShakeproofAssembly Components, 268 F.3d at 1376.
107. Stewart, supra note 32, at 696; see also Lantz, supra note 1, at 998.
108. Lantz, supra note 1, at 998-99.
109. Transcom, Inc. v. United States, 24 Ct. Int'l Trade 1253, 1267 (2000).
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information." ' "10 The respondents, particularly, have a responsibility to
provide the information as they incur any assessed duties."' The
requirements for the initial information that a petitioning party must
provide are lenient in order not to place undue burden on the party
bringing the action, 112 usually an interested domestic party on behalf of
the U.S. industry injured by the foreign good. 1 3 On the other hand,
Commerce can demand unlimited quantities of documents from the
accused companies with a short turnaround time and impose heavy
penalties for failure to comply. 114
"The average antidumping questionnaire is more than seventy
pages long,"' "15 must usually be translated first, and then distributed to
numerous employees." 16 It gathers information pertaining to the
company's factors of production, by requesting a description of the
company's production process for the merchandise under consideration,
including "specific types of raw materials, labor, energy, subcontractor
services, research, and development ..."17After Commerce receives
the list of factors of production, Commerce issues a supplemental
questionnaire, conducts a verification of the factors of production, 1 8 and
requests interested parties to submit any information pertaining to the
119
values of the factors that they believe Commerce should consider.
Thus, the plaintiff carries the burden of showing that the data presented
by the plaintiff should be the data upon which
Commerce relies to value
20
the factors of production in its calculations.
If a party cannot provide the information that Commerce requested
in a timely manner, in the required form, or if the party refuses to do so,
then Commerce uses "other available information.' 121 Commerce can in
110. Kaiyuan Group Corp. v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1310 (2004) (citing
Gourmet Equip. Corp. v. United States, 24 Ct. Int'l Trade 572, 574 (2000)).
111. Transcom, 24 Ct. Int'l Trade at 1267.
112.

Dorinda D. Bolander, Survey of the Court of InternationalTrade: Antidumping Actions of

1992, 56 ALB. L. REV. 1017, 1020 (1993).
113. 19U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(2005).
114. Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the United States with
Implicationsfor International Trade in Europe, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 539, 560

(1993).
115.

Id.at561.
Id.
117. See Raoping Xingyu Foods Co. v. United States, No. 02-00550, 2004 WL 1943743, at *2
(Ct. Int'l. Trade Aug. 31, 2004).
118. See Hangzhou Spring Washer Co. v. United States, No. 04-00133, 2005 WL 1592957, at
*2 (Ct. Int'l. Trade July 6, 2005).
119. See RaopingXingyu Foods, 2004 WL 1943743 at *2.
120. Tianjin Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 16 Ct. Int'l Trade 931, 936 (1992).
121. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a) (2005).
116.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol34/iss2/9

16

Piskorski: A Dangerous Discretionary "Duty": U.S. Antidumping Policy Toward

2005]

U.S. ANTIDUMPING POLICY

such instances also rely on adverse facts--data provided by the
petitioners-which may have been manipulated by the petitioners. 122
While Commerce corroborates any information received,123 if the
respondents do not provide requested information for an investigation,
Commerce may employ the adverse inferences in selecting from the
facts available, provided by either party.' 24 Thus, Commerce takes into
account the respondent's degree of cooperation. 25 Those respondents
who substantially cooperate, but nonetheless fail to provide the
requested information
receive a rate that is an adverse margin of the
26
possible choices. 1
A. Results of Congress's Discretion
Valuing the factors of production of the manufacturer, Commerce
does not need to rely on data and information submitted by the producer,
but can move to information that it determines more appropriately
represents the company's costs. 127 Commerce's discretion in choosing its
data is limited by the statute's ultimate goal "to construct the product's
normal value as it would have been if the NME country were a market
economy country"'' 28 by using the best available information. 129 "Where
there exists on the record 'alternative sources of data that would be
equally or more reliable ... it is within Commerce's discretion to use
either set of data.""' 3 While "best available information" is not
statutorily defined, in choosing the data upon which valuation of factors
of production will be based, Commerce, from publicly available
information, prefers to select values that are an average, non-export,

122. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (2005); Bolander, supra note 112, at 1041, 1046.
123. See, e.g., CEMEX, S.A. v. United States, 16 Ct. Int'l Trade 251, 256 (1992).
124. See F.LII De Cecco Di Fillippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States, 216 F.3d 1027,
1029 (Fed. Cir. 2000); 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (2005).
125. Allied-Signal Aerospace Co. v. United States, 996 F.2d 1185, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
126. Id.
127. The information, because it is supplied by interested parties, is subject to various
inaccuracies. Commerce has relied on annual reports in determining costs of production for market
exporters where other information received was unclear. See, e.g., Timkin Co. v. United States, 16
Ct. Int'l Trade 142, 144-45 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992). However, "annual reports issued by companies
are created [by company executives] to inform investors of their company's financial position,"
which will usually be portrayed in a positive light. Bolander, supra note 112, at 1046. "If [such]
reports [from one company] are instrumental in a Commission injury investigation, the resulting
determination may [also] be skewed." Id.
128. Rhodia Inc. v. United States, 25 Ct. Int'l Trade 1278, 1286 (2001).
129. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1) (2005).
130. Wuhan Bee Healthy Co. v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1304 (Ct. Int'l. Trade
2005) (citing Guem Poong Corp. v. United States, 26 Ct. Int'l Trade 322, 326 (2002)).
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representative of a range of prices within period of review, productspecific, tax-exclusive, reflective of product similar to that valued, and
from a single country. 13 1 The broad discretion bestowed to Commerce
132
permits it to determine the selected values on a case-by-case basis.
However, this afforded discretion results not only in a lack of
predictability in the information chosen, but also in a lack of accuracy in
the final dumping margin.
1. Representativeness of Country-wide Prices
While in one case Commerce has rejected information supplied by
a manufacturer for lack of representativeness, it has in another rejected
data that was fully representative of countrywide prices. Commerce
prefers "industry-wide values, rather than the values of a single
producer, wherever possible, because industry-wide values are more
representative of prices/costs of all producers in the surrogate
country."' 133 In Zhejiang Native Produce & Animal By-Products Import
& Export Corp. v. United States, Commerce rejected financial
statements of an Indian honey cooperative because the data represented
prices of a single processor in a particular region of the surrogate
country, India, despite the cooperative buying honey from several
sources. 134

However, even data supplied that is industry wide within the
surrogate country may still be rejected if it appears influenced by noneconomic factors. 135 In Crawfish ProcessorsAlliance v. United States,
Hontex Enterprises ("Hontex"), a Chinese exporter of crawfish,
submitted to Commerce information based upon a Spanish study for
valuing live whole crawfish, which Hontex used in the production of tail
meat. 13 6 Hontex maintained that the study was an official government
report sanctioned, formulated, and financed by the Andulician
government, decreasing the risk of data contamination by interested
private parties. Despite traditional reliance on similarly broad, industry-

131. Kaiyuan Group Corp. v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Shandong Huarong Mach. Co. v. United States, No. 03-00676, 2005 WL 1105110 (Ct. Int'l Trade
May 2, 2005).
132. Wuhan Bee Healthy Co., 374 F. Supp. 2d at 1308 (citing Peer Bearing Co. v. United
States, 25 Ct. Int'l Trade 1199, 1208 (2001)).
133. Zhejiang Native Produce & Animal By-Products Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 26
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2320, 2324 (Ct. Int'l. Trade 2004).
134. Id.
135. See generally Crawfish Processors Alliance v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2004).
136. Id. at 1246, 1248.
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wide averages and estimates as surrogate values, 137 Commerce rejected
the Spanish study because it was not a government report, but paid for
by an Andulician crawfish processor, and because it did not contain
complete price data, but was based on estimates rather than actual
transactions. 38 Because some of the crawfish companies to which the
questionnaires were sent provided full information and some provided
only partial responses, varying in degree of completeness, Commerce
maintained that it could not confirm that the information was comprised
of prices and not
of averages or that it was representative of a wide range
1 39
distorted by special interests of a private sector party.
Commerce has also rejected non country-wide data for one purpose,
but used the same decidedly delinquent information for another. 140 In
Wuhan Bee Healthy Co. v. United States, Commerce refused to use
pricing series submitted by Wuhan to value honey production factors
because it did not represent country-wide prices. 14 1 The pricing
information, the agency argued, was generated by only two farms
located in a particular region. 142 Nevertheless, Commerce maintained
that while the information was not appropriate to calculate values, it was
appropriate to calculate a necessary inflator. 43 According to the agency,
the information submitted by the two farms indicated that prices
increased during the period of review 144 and that it had no other
information upon which it could rely to calculate the inflation for the
real value of raw honey. 145 Thus, in the absence of other pertinent
information,
Commerce can reasonably use specific rather than country46
1
data.
wide
2. Domestic Price Over Import Price Preference
Even though Commerce generally seeks to use the actual prices
paid for imports from market economy countries when valuing an NME

137. Id. at 1248.
138.

Id. at 1250.

139. Id. at 1252-53. Commerce maintained that "the price data in the Spanish study were
averages calculated... upon numerous assumptions and possibly incomplete and/or inaccurate
and/or roughly estimated data." Id. at 1252.
140. Wuhan Bee Healthy Co., v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1305 (Ct. Int'l. Trade
2005).
141.

Id. at 1304-05.

142.
143.

Id.
Id.
at 1305.

144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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producer's factors of production, it has rejected such data. 147 It has
valued some of the NME producer's production factors based on their
value in a surrogate country, but other factors on the basis of the NME
producer's actual acquisition process. 148 In Wuhan, Wuhan submitted
data published in the TERI Energy Data Directory and Yearbook, for the
year at issue, to determine Indian surrogate value of coal, a factor in
Wuhan's honey production. 149 Commerce rejected the TERI data, which
reflected Indian domestic coal prices, maintaining that Indian import
data for coal valuation was more representative of competitive prices." 5
The court maintained that because Commerce prefers to use domestic
surrogate data over import surrogate data, it must be clearer as to the
reason for rejecting the data than merely maintaining that the import
price was the best available information.' 5'
3. Context of Data Compilation
Commerce has even rejected corroborated data, maintaining that
the data was prepared for purposes which would cast doubt upon the
applicability of the study for valuation purposes. 15 2 In Zhejiang Native
Produce, the plaintiffs study, published by the Agriculture and
Processed Food Products Export Development Authority, was offered to
establish the price of raw honey and was rejected. 153 Commerce
disqualified the data because the data reflected an average value of
honey appearing in context of a discussion concerning the development
of a model for "doubling the number of bee colonies every two years,"
rather than for the purpose of valuing honey. 154 In Wuhan, Commerce
rejected the producer's suggested values that were based on a study,
maintaining that while three Spanish companies stated that the prices in
the Spanish study were accurate, the study still failed to be considered as
the best available information because there was no information
155
regarding the study's structure, methodology, and verification.

147. Bogard & Menghetti, supranote 80, at 231.
148. Id. at 230.
149. Wuhan Bee Healthy Co., 374 F. Supp. 2d at 1309.
150. Id. at 1309-10.
151. Id. at 1310-11.
152. Zhejiang Native Produce & Animal By-Products Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 26
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2320, 2323 (Ct. Int'l. Trade 2004).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Wuhan Bee Healthy Co., 374 F. Supp. 2d at 1302-03.
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4. Contemporaneity with the Period of Review
While Commerce prizes specific data, it has rejected it for more
general data that is more contemporaneous with the period of
investigation.156 In valuing overhead and profit in Hangzhou Spring
Washer Co. v. United States, Commerce rejected specific data submitted
by the producers because it was not contemporaneous with the period of
review, an important factor given the quickly transforming Indian
economy. 157 However, Commerce may again reject such information in
another case, with contemporaneity giving way, where the
contemporaneous data does not refer to a product substantially similar to
the factor being valued.158
In Shandong Huarong Machinery, Huarong exported heavy forged
tools from China, such as bars and wedges. 159 Commerce rejected
Huarong's information pertaining to the valuation of brokerage and
handling factors because the information related to a product that was
not similar to the bars and wedges Huarong produced. 60 Commerce
maintained that the bars and wedges that Huarong produced were more
similar to stainless steel wire rod rather than hot-rolled steel flat products
because both steel wire rod and bars and wedges are small in diameter
and both are shipped in containers.161 As a result, Commerce rejected the
brokerage and handling surrogate values pertaining to hot-rolled steel
flat products submitted by Huarong even though it was more
contemporaneous than the brokerage and handling costs for steel wire
rod. 162
5. Quantity of Imports
According to Commerce, small-quantity import information is more
reliable where per-unit value is approximately the same for the per-unit
values of the larger quantity imports of that product from other
countries. 63 In Kaiyuan Group Corp. v. United States, the volume of
pencil cores imported into Indonesia was substantially greater than that
156.

See Hangzhou Spring Washer Co. v. United States, No. 04-00133, 2005 WL 1592957, at

*6 (Ct. Int'l. Trade July 6, 2005).
157.
158.
*7-8 (Ct.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
2004).

Id.at*ll.
See Shandong Huarong Mach. Co. v. United States, No. 03-00676, 2005 WL 1105110, at
Int'l Trade May 2, 2005).
Seeid. at*7.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See Kaiyuan Group Corp. v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1314 (Ct. Int'l Trade
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imported into India.164 Nevertheless, Indian imports from seven different
countries were considered substantial.165 Commerce used Indian import
data because the weighted-average Indian import price did not
66
substantially vary from the weighted-average Indonesian import price. 1
6. Similarity of Products
Commerce must also determine, even before the determination as to
the surrogate value of a particular factor, which factor in the surrogate
country is most similar to the factor the company under investigation
utilized. In Raoping Xingyu Foods Co. v. United States, the court
maintained that the surrogate factor for oil used in canning differed
substantially in quality, which was indicated first by its large price
discrepancy, adjusted from NME costs. 16 7 As a result, Commerce could
not use surrogate price of heavy oil to calculate the company's cheap
heavy fuel cost.' 68 In Hebei Metals v. United States, Commerce found
that surrogate value submitted by Hebei for coal was aberrational,
because it had a larger percent variation between the highest and lowest
prices over its own data variation. 169 However, the Court of International
Trade remanded the case to Commerce because it failed to provide that
coal yielded a
the data was insufficient to demonstrate why imported
70
more accurate surrogate value than domestic coal. 1
7. Inconsistent Data
Data submitted by a producer was also rejected where different
information submitted by third parties contradicted the information. In
Wuhan, a Chinese producer and exporter of raw honey, submitted an
article appearing in an Indian newspaper on which Commerce refused to
rely in valuing the factors of production of raw honey because the prices
in the article were contradicted by information submitted by
petitioners.' 71 Commerce rejected the prices in the article, relying on
import prices from Germany and China. According to other data, no

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Raoping Xingyu Foods Co. v. United States, No. 02-00550, 2004 WL 1943743, at *3 (Ct.
Int'l. Trade Aug. 31, 2004).
168. Id.
169. Hebei Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1275
(Ct. Int'l Trade 2005).
170.

171.
2005).

Id.

Wuhan Bee Healthy Co. v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1302 (Ct. Int'l Trade
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honey was imported into India from Argentina, China, and Germany. 172
While Wuhan submitted official export statistics for raw honey from
China and Germany for the same period, it was "not sufficient to
overcome the totality of the evidence cited by Commerce of the
proffered article's lack of

utility.'

173

This reasoning poses perhaps the

most dangerous risk because petitions from injured parties will most
likely contain data contradictory to the data presented by the investigated
company.
8. Anomalies in Data
Considering a wide range of values for a particular factor,
Commerce often excludes anomalies to ensure the reliability of the
calculation; however, it has in circumstances included such data in its
calculations. 174 In Zhejiang, "the weighted-average of the honey unit
import values from all other countries was approximately $69.74 less
than Commerce's calculation of the normal value of honey sold by
Zhejiang."' 175 The anomaly was the result of the large volume of lower
priced honey imported from Argentina. 176 To remedy the wide
discrepancy and distorted results, Commerce removed the data from
Argentina and used a simple average to value raw honey, an average of
the highest and lowest values. 177 However, in Hebei Metals, Commerce
chose not to exclude Swedish import value from the surrogate value for
steel pallets even though it was 1,134% greater than the average of other
countries' import values. 178 Commerce argued that it excluded only
those Indian imports sourced from "NME countries and countries
maintaining non-industry specific export subsidies, which might distort
export prices. Because Swedish steel tube value did not fall into either
category, Commerce found no reason to exclude it.' ' 1 79 The Court of
International Trade remanded the decision for Commerce to provide180a
reasonable explanation for the failure to exclude the aberrational data.

172.
173.
174.

Id. at 1304.
Id.
Zhejiang Native Produce & Animal By-Products Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 26

I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2320, 2325-26 (Ct. Int'l. Trade 2004).
175.

Id. at 2326.

176. Id.
177.

Id.

178. Hebei Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, No. 03-00442, 2004 Ct.
Int'l Trade LEXIS 89, at *33 (July 19, 2004).
179. Id. at *11.
180. Id. at*25.
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9. Producer's Cooperation
Not only can Commerce choose to reject the producer's
information pertaining to values of factors of production in the
calculation, but Commerce can also apply adverse facts available.' 8' In
Tianjin Machine Import and Export Corp. v. United States, Commerce
applied adverse facts on the record because upon Commerce's arrival at
Tianjin's factory to verify packing factors reported in the review, it
discovered that the factory had been closed ten months prior to the
visit.182 Moreover, the company failed to maintain factory and packing
material records which were used in compiling the data in the
questionnaire response.' 83 On the other hand, in Globe Metallurgical,
Inc. v. United States, Commerce declined to use adverse facts because
the company, Bratsk, acted in good faith to provide valuation of factors
of production information. 184 Bratsk reported that it reused silicon metal
to produce more silicon metal. 185 However, Bratsk did not include
information regarding the amount of the metal fines reused in
production.186 Despite the lack of information provided, Commerce did
not apply adverse facts available because Bratsk had been "cooperative
and acted to the best of its ability to provide information during the
proceeding.''187 Instead of using adverse facts available, Commerce
determined the amount of metal fines used based on the difference
between the amount of metal silicon produced
and the amount reported
188
as sold using the company's information.
Commerce may also apply partial facts available instead of adverse
facts even if the partial facts are not complete. 189 In Luoyang, Commerce
declined to apply adverse facts available, which were submitted by an
injured company and encouraged to be used, because plaintiff acted "to
the best of its ability to obtain factors of production ... information."' 90
The plaintiff supplied Commerce with "documentation of its efforts to
181.

Tianjin Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1298-99 (Ct.

Int'l Trade 2004). But cf Globe Metallurgical, Inc. v. United States, No. 03-00202, 2005 WL
1799891, at *2 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2005) (noting that Commerce chose not to apply adverse facts
because the petitioners cooperated with the agency).
182. Tianjin Mach. Imp. & Exp. Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
183. Id. at 1298-99.
184. Globe Metallurgical,Inc., 2005 WL 1799891 at *2.
185. Id.

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.

189. Luoyang Bearing Corp. v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1304-05 (Ct. Int'l. Trade
2005).
190. Id.at 1304.
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obtain the information from its suppliers," where it could not obtain the
information.' 9' As a result of the plaintiffs good faith effort to supply
Commerce with the requested information,
Commerce rejected the
92
defendant's urging to apply adverse affects. 1
B. Effects of the Discretion
"While Commerce enjoys broad discretion in determining what
constitutes the best information available to calculate [normal value],
' 93
Commerce may not act arbitrarily in reaching its decision."'
Nevertheless, the reasonableness standard in the case-by-case approach
for choosing the best available information, as illustrated above, leaves
Commerce wide leeway in choosing the data for valuing the factors of
production. 194 This discretion, permitting Commerce to move further and
further away from the actual values, leads to inaccurate dumping
margins contravening the statute's intention of calculating the dumping
95
margins as accurately as possible.
In addition, in certain cases Commerce rejects information supplied
on the basis that it is unspecific or not contemporaneous, but may accept
such data in other cases. Moreover, Commerce can even use a blend of
sources and surrogates to determine foreign market value of goods from
a NME country. 19 6 Thus, Commerce's discretion

also results in

producers' and exporters' inability to predict which submitted data
Commerce will accept for valuing its factors of production and which it
will reject.
Last, foreign producers from NME countries, whose exports have
grown substantially in the United States, may become cautious because
Commerce may be persuaded to choose data resulting in a high
antidumping duty to protect its domestic industry. This may discourage
foreign producers from exporting their products. Curtailing export

191. Id.at 1305.
192. Id. Commerce maintained that the plaintiff would not benefit from submitting incomplete
factors of production data, that the plaintiff's competitors would understandably be reluctant to
provide proprietary information, and prior higher antidumping duties in previous reviews provided
an incentive for the plaintiff to cooperate. Id. at n.7.
193. Crawfish Processors Alliance v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1251 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2004).
194. See supra Part IlIl.A; see also Shakeproof Assembly Components Div. of Ill. Tool Works,
Inc. v. United States, 268 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Nation Ford Chem. Co. v. United
States, 166 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
195. Commerce must determine margins as accurately as possible, and use the best information
available to it in doing so. See id. at 1382.
196. Timken Co. v. United States, 23 Ct. Int'l Trade 509, 514 (1999).
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activities may lead to less foreign currency for that country, and in turn
lower compliance with international trade norms.
1. Inaccuracy
Calculating the normal value of the good produced, Commerce at
its discretion may choose information that it deems best available, which
may prove different than that submitted by the producer, to serve as the
values of the factors of production. Based on information for values
Commerce deemed as best available,- the calculated normal value of the
product may be far from the manufacturer's actual cost of producing the
good. As a result, the final dumping margin is inaccurate because the
further one moves from the product's normal value, the more inaccurate
the outcome. The resulting inaccuracy contradicts the statute's intention
that the dumping margin be calculated as accurately as possible. "[T]he
accuracy of an antidumping [investigation and] determination is
credibility of the
extremely important because it increases 'the
97
determination and it creates an equitable result."'
2. Predictability
The outcome of an antidumping investigation is also unpredictable
because a NME country has no advance knowledge of which surrogate
will be used to determine its prices. 198 Furthermore, Commerce has
insisted that it can only decide on a case-by-case basis which countries
will be considered to have an economy that is state controlled for
purposes of certain industries, and which surrogate values will be
accepted or rejected. 99 A producer cannot "know before an export is
made whether the question of fair value will be determined on the basis
of the exporting nation's home market price or data from an as yet
unidentified surrogate., 200 Thus, the producer in China would have no
means of finding out at the time of its export that it should, in effect,
have been pricing as a producer in the surrogate country which was
chosen in the end.2° 1 Importers are thus unable to plan ahead and set
their prices to assure compliance with the dumping laws.20 2

197.

Bolander, supra note 112, at 1046.

198. Alford, supra note 8, at 92.
199. See Natural Menthol From the People's Republic of China: Antidumping-Preliminary
Investigation, 46 Fed. Reg. 3258 (Jan. 14, 1981).
200. Alford, supra note 8, at 92.
201. See Wang, supranote 20, at 620-21.
202. Horlick & Shuman, supra note 68, at 817.
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3. Decreased Transformations
Furthermore, Commerce's determination may impose prohibitive
company-specific import duties, placing the exporting company at a
competitive disadvantage in relation to domestic producers.2 °3 Where
unnaturally high duties are imposed on goods from NME countries, the
manufacturers' ability to sell and export their products into the United
States is decreased. 204 "Reducing the access of NME in transition
manufacturers to the United States market will harm the process of
market reform, because successful implementation of many of the
market reforms requires economy in transition countries to export
products to earn Western currency. 20 5
In addition to the inaccurate margins, unpredictability and
decreased cooperation in international norms, antidumping calculations
toward NMEs have also been criticized as a "bureaucrat's Nirvana,"
often occurring "as a result of American bureaucrat's manipulation of
numbers, rather than actual foreign business practices., 20 6 The low
threshold requirement can increase the risk of manipulation by private
petitioners by allowing them to easily instigate antidumping
investigations to harass competing importers.20 7 While a party
attempting to exert political influence in a case will usually be identified
in the public record,20 8 a foreign government will likewise intercede
without always being identified because of the wide array of entry
209
points.
C. Effects of the U.S. Antidumping Regime with Respect to China
Due to their low prices, U.S. imports from China have grown
substantially to the detriment of U.S. industries .210 "U.S. industries thus
have an increasing interest in effective implementation of the unfair
trade remedy laws as applied to NMEs. ' 2 1 1 Of the petitions filed with

203. Hongliu Gong, Note, Legal Strategies for Challenging the Current EU Anti-Dumping
Campaign Against Imports from China: A Chinese Perspective, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 575, 592
(2002).
204. Lantz, supranote 1, at 1008.
205. Id.
206. Yu, supra note 27, at 327-28.
207. See generally Malcolm D. Rowat, Protectionist Tilts in Antidumping Legislation of
Developed Countries and LDC Response: Is the "'Race to the Bottom " Inevitable?, J. WORLD
TRADE, Dec. 1990, at 5.
208. Stewart, supra note 32, at 727.
209. See id.
210. Bogard & Menghetti, supra note 80, at 221.
211. Id.
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Commerce by domestic industries alleging dumping against foreign
firms, ninety-six percent were deemed to be dumping.2 12 High duties
have damaged several Chinese industries and led to their loss of market
share on the European market.213 Compared to all its trading partners,
China has the greatest number of antidumping suits against it with more
than 450 antidumping cases initiated by the end of 2001 against more
than 4,000 categories of Chinese products.214 Of these suits, almost half
were brought by the United States,215 with low import prices as the main
216
In the last three years, the United States
reason for the accusation.
"initiated ... more anti-dumping orders against China than against any
other country, and more than twice as many [as initiated] against the
next leading country. 2 17
The European Commission and the Council of the European Union
also consider China a NME country. They have applied arguably
discriminatory and unfair policy in determining the margin of dumping
and injury to alleged Chinese exporters, allowing an artificially high
dumping/injury margin to be established.218 Thus, China has not only
become a target of U.S. antidumping practice but of the EU as well. By
the end of 1999, the EU had 151 antidumping and five anti-subsidy
actions commenced.21 9 China was involved in 21% of these measures;
35% of the measures were commenced against firms from NMEs. 2 2 °
1. China's Emerging Economy and Commerce's Incentive
Focus upon China's achievements may lead one to think that China
will "tilt global trade and technology balances in its favor, ultimately
becoming an economic, technological, and military threat to the United
States., 221 Through its transition from a centrally planned economy
212. Corr, supra note 40, at 54.
213. Gong, supra note 203, at 592.
214. Yu, supra note 27, at 298-99.
215. Id. at 299.
216. Id.
217. Fairor Foul, supra note 23, at 11. "In 2003 alone, more than 50 percent of all of [the]
new anti-dumping orders put in place [by the United States] have been against China. Historically
that number has been about 15 percent." Id.
218. Gong, supra note 203, at 576.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221.

George J. Gilboy, The Myth Behind China's Miracle, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2004, at

33; see also Richard N. Haass & Nicholas Lardy, The United States and China:A New Framework,
BROOKINGS

INST.

POLICY

BRIEF

No.

25

(1997),

available

at

http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb25.htm. (noting that international peace is
considered endangered by China's exportation of technology of mass destruction to nonpeaceful
nations).
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toward a market oriented economy, China's rate of economic growth
over the past twenty years has yielded increases in wealth,222
contributing to almost one-third of global GDP growth.223 The volume of
trade conducted between China and other countries between 1999 and
2000 rose by 31.5%.224 "China's total exports grew eightfold-to over
$380 billion-between 1990 and 2003; and its exports in the electronics
industry" accounted for 30% of Asia's total exports in 2002.225 In 2002,
imports from China totaled nearly $147 billion, beating out Japan and
Mexico as the United States' second largest source of imports 226 and in
2004, China together with America accounted for close to half of global
growth.22 7 China's economic expansion has also benefited Brazil, ending
as Brazil's third-largest importer at the end of 2003.228
The increase in wealth and economic expansion has fueled U.S.
policy analysts' speculation about China's future intentions.2 29
Conservative commentators maintain that China has hegemonic
aspirations signified through its military build-up and that it will not be
pacified by moves to bring it into the international trading order.230 It is

feared that "China will [become] more, not less, resistant to international
pressure, and that, far from being bound in by trading interdependence,
China will seek to exploit its economic power for political purposes by
from its market
threatening to cut out individual companies or countries
231
demands."
Beijing's
with
compliant
prove
they
unless
Moreover, concern has been mounting over the United States'
considerable and growing trade deficit with China. 232 The deficit was
222. See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1995: WORKERS IN AN
INTEGRATING WORLD 162-63 tbl.l (1995). "Much of this growth was due to an enormous export

drive which accumulated into US $96 billion in worldwide exports in 1991, and US $8.590 billion
to the United States alone in 1992." Bellocchi, supra note 1, at 177-78.
223. The Dragon and the Eagle: China'sEconomy is Larger than It Looks, ECONOMIST, Oct.
2, 2004, at 8 [hereinafter Larger than It Looks].
224. Mike Smith & Nicholas Khoo, China and US Foreign Policy in the Asia-Pacgic: Living
with American Dominance 22 ROYAL INST. OF INT'L AFFS. 1,4 (2001).
225. David Hale & Lyric Hughes Hale, China Takes Off, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2003, at
36.
226. Fairor Foul, supra note 23, at 10.
227. Larger Than it Looks, supra note 223, at 3.
228. Brazil: ChinaAppeal, BUS. LATIN AM., May 17, 2004, at 2.

229. See generally Rosen, supra note 11, at 1549-50. One of the reasons the United States
promoted Chinese accession to the WTO was to maintain Chinese compliance with international
norms. Id. It will be more difficult (i.e. costly) for China to break off economic ties by violating
international trade agreements and norms with China, a member of the WTO. Id.
230. Smith & Khoo, supranote 224, at 4.
231. Id. at 4; Haass and Lardy, supra note 221, at 1 (speculating that "the United States might
one day find itself in the position of having to contain an expansionist, hostile China").
232. Hale & Hale, supra note 225 at 37.
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exceeding $1 billion per week in China's favor while American exports
to China have totaled $9 billion since it received Most Favored Nation
("MFN") status in 1980.233 In fact, the growing number of imports
originate from China.23 4 These speculations pose a dangerous incentive
for the United States to adopt more protectionist policies 235 toward
Chinese imports through high antidumping duties.
2. Validity of China's Threat
While Chinese imports in the U.S. market have grown, China is not
in a position to disregard U.S. or international norms. "Even if China can
make everything more cheaply than America, it will enjoy a much
bigger cost advantage in labour-intensive industries.
,236 However,
China will not be able to continue to compete on price because as it
becomes more capable it becomes more expensive. 23 7 China also not
only lacks foreign direct investment necessary to isolate a country from
needing to rely on other markets, but it also lacks a strong middle class.
In addition, monopoly motivated dumping does not occur as often as
espoused and even if it did, it can be curtailed through measures such as
the antitrust regime.23 8
a.

Direct Foreign Investment Weakness

Even though China has maintained a strong rate of economic
growth in recent years, U.S. fears of China's possible "go it alone"
aspirations are misplaced because China's economy depends on direct
foreign investment. 239 In fact, most of China's exporters are foreigninvestment enterprises.24 ° China has pursued export led growth based on
competition for foreign direct investment, setting itself up "as [a] lowcost offshore manufacturing centre[] for multinational corporations in

233. Id. at 36; see, e.g., Charlene Barshefsky, Remarks at the Asia Society, Toward the Pacific
Community:
American Trade Policy in Asia (Jan. 21,
1999), available at
http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/barshefsky2.html.
234. Id.
235. See Gilboy, supra note 221, at 33.
236. The Dragon and the Eagle, The Halo Effect: How.China's Expansion Will Affect Growth
andJobs Elsewhere, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2004, at 9, 12 [hereinafter The Halo Effect].
237. See Neil King, Jr., A Whole New World, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2004, at RI, R3.
238.

STEPHEN D. COHEN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY 169 (2d ed.

2003).
239. "[Foreign direct investment], exports and fixed-asset investment have been the important
pillars of China's economic growth during the past decade." Phelim Kyne, Foreign Investment in
China Remains Strong, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2004, at AS.
240. Gong, supra note 203, at 595.
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which growth was characterized by the export of cheap, labour-intensive
products mainly to the North American market. ''24' Foreign direct
investment in total domestic investment was calculated at slightly more
than eight percent.242 The domestic private sector cannot compete with
these dominant foreign firms nor can it compete with the strong state
owned enterprises. Therefore, "China's growth [is] highly dependent on
continued access to the U.S. market (where much of the manufacturing
output is exported) .... With antidumping actions against China
increasing and profits decreasing, foreign investors may stop investing in
the Chinese industries affected by the investigations.2 44
Furthermore, the investment is not necessarily balanced between
basic industries and other sectors. 245 "Decentralization has also
eliminated a number of avenues (e.g., price controls, foreign exchange
controls, and market protection) through which the government can
subsidize the state actor and reduce[] its capacity to subsidize the sector
through fiscal systems. 2 46 The government remained dedicated to
supporting the state sector, which required continuous control over
financial decisions.24 7 As a result, there has been a weakening in the
commitment to the state sector.2 48 "Faced with supporting the state
sector at its current level and suffering the prospect of a sustained
slowdown in growth, the government
appears to have chosen to reduce
249
its support for the state sector.,
b.

Middle Class Unemployment

China has undergone substantial economic decentralization that has
allowed the entry and rapid growth of non-state enterprises and has
increased the incentives to allocate resources to more profitable
enterprises and sectors. 250 Focusing on becoming a regional leader,
China has faced problems such as a "widening gap between its urban

241.

Smith & Khoo, supra note 224, at 4.

242. T.K. Bhaumik, Implications of China's Entry into the WTO, WORLD AFF., Oct.-Dec.
2001, available at http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/wa/wa-oct0l b.html.
243. Smith & Khoo, supra note 224, at 4.
244. Gong, supra note 203, at 595.
245. See King Jr., supra note 237, at R1. China's apparel and technology exports have boomed
largely thanks to foreign investment. Id.
246. Loren Brandt & Xiaodong Zhu, Redistribution in a DecentralizedEconomy: Growth and
Inflation in China under Reform, 108 J. POL. ECON. 422, 437-38 (2000).

247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 438.
Id.
Id.
Id.at425.
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and rural populations, growing unemployment, and the increased
challenges posed by its aging population., 25 1 Before China can become a
viable threat, China must create a true middle class for social stability by
creating an environment for developing a broad services sector, "ranging
from high-end telecommunications and financial and legal services to
retail, entertainment, and personal services ..... 252
c.

Monopoly Incentive

Last, if China is actually pursuing monopoly motivated export
policies, antitrust laws exist to curtail such effects. Antitrust statutes are
designed to deter aggressive low prices.253 The laws recognize that price
discrimination is a commercially legitimate activity,254 and antidumping
laws are often really just a manifestation of special interest pleading by a
few industries in the manufacturing sector that have utilized the
emotionally charged phrase "fair trade" for their own unfair use.255 A
U.S. Congressional Budget Office study has maintained that the
oligopoly or monopoly in whose name the laws are implemented rarely
occurs, 256 and that predatory pricing "is substantially less common than

price discrimination and selling below cost ....257
Monopolizing dumping made up less than ten percent of
antidumping cases. 255 With "increasing competition among a variety of
export suppliers from different countries, predatory pricing practices
arguably are futile because market domination and monopolistic pricing
are not attainable.,, 259 "[N]o rational, unsubsidized company would

undertake the risk of pursuing predatory pricing in a foreign market,"
because the company would not have enough time to recoup its losses
through monopoly power.260 By the time a monopoly is acquired,

251.

Hale & Hale, supra note 225; at 36.

252.

See Howard M. Krawitz, China's Trade Opening: Implicationsfor Regional Stability, 193

STRATEGIC F. 2 (2002).
253. See COHEN, supra note 238, at 168-69.

254. See id.at 169.
255. Ronald A. Cass & Richard D. Boltuck, Antidumping and Countervailing-DutyLaw: The
Mirage of Equitable International Competition, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND

HARMONIZATION:

PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 351 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996).
256. Corr, supra note 40, at 99.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Bellocchi, supra note 1, at 180-81.
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another firm will enter the market where there is a profit to be made by
underpricing the company maintaining a monopoly in the market.26 1
Chinese corporations in practice do not have the leisure to wait for
the benefits from monopolizing the U.S. market.262 Chinese officials
maintain that China is a developing country and that it does not have the
"economic strength necessary to dump its commodities overseas." 263
"They emphasize that the low prices of Chinese export commodities
were simply the result of the 'relatively cheap labor' and 'low
production costs' in China. ' ' 264 Furthermore, the differential can be
caused by a variety of factors unrelated to dumping. The manufacturer
may enjoy a "real" competitive advantage resulting from a laborintensive production policy 265 or an economy of scale. 266 Furthermore,
the choice of the surrogate country may have been misguided, or the
surrogate country may be subsidizing its producers.2 67
IV.

U.S. INTERNAL IMPLICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS

A.

Protectionism

U.S. antidumping rules may certainly be viewed as protectionist
measures. Protectionist policies adopted toward China due to the fear of
China becoming the next "superpower" will subject U.S. antidumping
policies to more criticism and less credibility within trade relations. The
purpose of antidumping laws-to protect domestic industry from the
effects of foreign firms dumping their products-is subject to abuse,
having the potential result of punishing foreign firms.268 While the case
261. Id. at 181.
262. Seeid.at 180-81.
263. Yu, supra note 27, at 301.
264. Id.
265. Bellocchi, supra note 1, at 187. "The Gross National Product has grown from RMB
506.24 billion in 1978 to RMB 1,902 billion in 1993 .... China's trade with the United States alone
has increased from US $2.663 billion in 1986 to US $8.590 billion in 1992. In addition, the United
States takes in 25.6% of China's exports directly through Hong Kong." Id.
266. Hoyt, supra note 99, at 1657.
267. Id.
268. Policies that protect domestic firms at the expense of restricting imports from a certain
country may also be instituted because of U.S. disapproval of the importing country's human rights
policies or an attempt to change those policies. The U.S.-China WTO agreement was expected to
strengthen the rule of law in China by promoting the basic rules of transparency, nondiscrimination,
judicial review, and administrative independence, all of which are considered critical to the
functioning of a modem economy. See Press Release, USTR, U.S., China Sign Historic Trade
Agreement (Nov.
15,
1999),
available at http://www.usconsulate.org.hk/uscn/trade
/general/ustr/1999/l115a.htm. However, the U.S. expectations were disappointed in 2000 when
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against protectionism is strong, political leaders continue to advocate the
policies, protecting only one special interest, even though these policies
have failed in the past.269 In addition, many critics argue that predatory
pricing either does not exist, or that it exists only in isolated cases, and
only then for a short period of time. 270 "[S]uch behavior is irrational and
would reduce profits, . . . [and] drive a 'predator' out of business. 27'
Moreover, "the actual net effect of protectionism is a reduction in the
total number of jobs," inefficient government subsidization, slowed
economic growth and standard of living, reduction in entrepreneurial
initiative, lower product quality, and "loss of individual rights since
consumers and producers-buyers and seliers-are less free to enter into
contracts. 2 72 Costs are also involved in administering the various
protectionist schemes, which must be paid for by taxpayers, consumers,
and those whose livelihood depends on importing products.2 73
On the receiving end of the policy, the United States has more and
more become an object of resentment because official U.S. government
policies are widely received among ordinary Chinese people as
"incomprehensible, hostile, bullying, and even paranoid." 274 "The U.S.
antidumping laws are criticized by foreign governments and
corporations and by pro-import domestic groups as arbitrary, capricious,
and protectionist., 275 Nevertheless, the U.S.-China relationship is one of
the most important bilateral relationships today, with economics being
very much part of the picture. 276 As a result, "the positions that the U.S.
Congress received the U.S. human rights report criticizing China for its deteriorating human rights
record throughout 1999 due to intensified government efforts to suppress dissent. BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1999 COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS
PRACTICES
(2000),
available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global

/human rights/I 999_hrpreport/china.html.
269. McGee, supra note 114, at 539. One of the reasons protectionism succeeds
is because special interests-auto manufacturers, steel companies, the textile industry,
and others-have much to gain by enlisting the aid of government to protect them from
foreign competition. On the other hand, the large majority of the population, comprised
of unorganized consumers, has little to lose by any particular protectionist legislation,
and may not even know that the measure is costing it money in the form of higher prices.
Id. at 541.
270. Id. at 544.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 545, 554.
273. Id. at 554.
274. Michael Swaine & Minxin Pei, Rebalancing United States-ChinaRelations, 30 CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE 1, 5 (2002).

275. COHEN, supra note 238, at 167.
276. See Fair or Foul, supra note 23, at 60. While U.S. exports to China have expanded,
Chinese exports to the United States have grown at a much quicker rate, with a rapidly growing
deficit. Id.
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Commerce Department is likely to take in administrative proceedings
have become more predictable" over the last several years as it has
adopted various antidumping factors and methodologies, which it
considers in valuing factors of production. 277 "[W]here parties fully
participate in the administrative review process and take advantage of
the opportunity to raise and argue issues before a final determination is
made, there is a degree of predictability in regard to what adjustments
the Commerce Department will allow in the calculation of dumping
margins. ,,278 However, those foreign producers who are unsatisfied with
the determination process will avoid marketing goods in the United
States, "thus impeding the goal of a global economy. ' '279 Not only are
consumers affected by making foreign goods unavailable, but foreign
relations are also adversely impacted. 280 Additional, new markets which
U.S. businesses may want to enter may also hesitate to commence trade
relations with the United States, as they may be discouraged as a result
of decreased U.S. credibility, 28' in the end decreasing opportunities at
international cooperation.2 82
B. Solutions
U.S. policy should attempt to move from a strict comparable
country method for assessing anti-dumping duties to an analysis treating
NME countries similarly to market economy countries-a move taken
by the E.U.-or by setting a standard for when Commerce can move to
best available information. In the E.U., normal value concerning imports
from China will be determined similarly as for market economy
countries if the producer can show that the market economy conditions
prevail for this producer with respect to the manufacture and sale of the
like product concerned, a lower standard than that required under the
U.S. antidumping law.2 83
"Commerce, using its administrative discretion, has addressed [the
high standard] by devising new methods to determine the point at which
NME in transition sourced factor input prices sufficiently reflect market
forces for inclusion in the FMV calculation. 2 84 Two possible
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Stewart, supra note 32, at 725.
Id.
Bolander, supra note 112, at 1042.
Id.
Id.
McGee, supra note 114, at 551.
Gong, supra note 203, at 585.
Lantz, supra note 1, at 1008.
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suggestions were rejected during the Uruguay Round Agreements.
The first included a review of markets in question over a five year
period.286 At the end of the review, "countries would either 'graduate' to
market economy status or return to the NME category. 287 Under the
second proposal, Commerce could suspend antidumping investigations
in circumstances where the foreign manufacturer agreed to stop sales at
less than FMV or to eliminate the injurious activity.28 8 While Commerce
has the ability to suspend a pending antidumping investigation
currently,28 9 the proposal provided Commerce with a broader range of
options in negotiating suspension agreements. 9 °
While the proposals were rejected, increased transparency and
equity has been attempted in Commerce's NME treatment under the
antidumping regime. To further the statute's goal, Commerce should use
NME sourced input prices where possible because this preserves the
comparative advantage enjoyed by manufacturers in the input factors
29 1
they use most, so long as they are subject to market-driven pricing.
Additionally, "using market driven input costs promotes the deregulation
of prices and wages within an economy in transition country." 92 Thus,
the approach would assist in "integrating the economy with international
markets and help maintain a freely convertible currency .. . because free
trade requires that a country's currency reflect the true value of the
products produced by economy in transition manufacturers, a value
determined in large part by input and wage prices. 293
Another possible solution is to afford the Court of International
Trade ("CIT") a heightened standard of review. Currently, the CIT has a
limited standard of review in Commerce decisions.294 The CIT must
sustain Commerce's determination unless it is unsupported by
substantial evidence on the record, or the decision is not in accordance
with the law. 295 The reasonableness standard is a deferential standard
285. Id. at 1050.
286. Id. at 1050-51.
287. Id. at 1053.
288. Id.
289. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671c (2005).
290. Lantz, supra note 1, at 1053-54. "[T]he suspension agreement[s] [would have] insured
that significant injury caused by imports from economies in transition would be remedied in the
short term, while enhanced enforcement authority would promote effective long range agreements."
Id. at 1054.
291. Id. at 1069.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1) (2005).
295. Id.
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that affords Commerce much latitude in determining antidumping duties,
as their reasonable interpretation will be upheld even if the court could
have come to a contrary conclusion.2 96 When a remand occurs under this
standard, the court often merely asks for an explanation of Commerce's
findings.29 7 Thus, Commerce may easily review a report upon remand
and still come to the same conclusions.2 98
Commerce and the Commission are given this wide leeway because
they, like most specialized governmental agencies, "are authorities in the
investigation and determination of dumping activity., 299 The CIT,
however, also has "specialized expertise and thus maintains the ability to
effectively review antidumping determinations" because the court's
jurisdiction encompasses primarily such specialized categories of
international trade issues as antidumping, countervailing duties, and
import restrictions. 300 However, the reasonableness standard restricts the
court from extensively scrutinizing the methods used by the agencies in
the investigations.3 °1
Under a more thorough standard for when Commerce can move
toward using best available information, the court can guide Commerce
to take into account the "legitimacy of using a surrogate country to
determine home market data for non-market economies, and the use of
'best information available' to manipulate determination results. 30 2 The
case-by-case approach to determining what constitutes best available
information can be abandoned for a more bright-line regulatory standard.
Given the antidumping statute's purpose to calculate dumping margins
as accurately as possible, data that is completely removed from the
actual factors of production used, and their values, calls into question the
accuracy of the calculation. Furthermore, where adverse facts are
applied, the accuracy focus is even further diluted.

296. See Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 16 Ct. Int'l Trade 539, 540-41 (1992).
297. See id.
298. In Crawfish, Commerce rejected Hontex's two submissions corroborating the Spanish
Study upon which, Hontex argued, Commerce should have relied as the source for valuing live
whole crawfish. Crawfish Processors Alliance v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2004). The court remanded Commerce's final results, instructing Commerce to reconsider its
decision to use Australian or Spanish data only if Hontex's submissions were so compelling that its
original decision to not use the Spanish data became unreasonable. Id. at 1248. Commerce did not
have to reconsider every aspect of its decision of whether Australian or Spanish data was the best
available information. Id.
299. Bolander, supranote 112, at 1040.
300. Id. at 1047.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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CONCLUSION

The United States has encouraged countries that have been
transforming their economies to free-markets and shedding government
influence to adhere to free trade rules. Nevertheless, trade imbalance has
occurred as a result of cheap imports. When imports are sold at a lower
price in the United States than comparable domestic goods, the domestic
injury will be lost sales and market share, resulting in lost profits and
potentially exiting the market. Since 2000, the United States has lost
over 2.7 million manufacturing jobs due to domestic inability to compete
with Chinese businesses.0 3 As a result, the U.S. government aids the
domestic industry in competing with the cheaper imports by imposing a
tax on the cheaper imports. Commerce may want to impose a high tax on
the import to ensure that the domestic industry can compete and to
maintain a check on Chinese hegemonic aspirations. The growing trade
deficit between China and the United States has increased the calls for
protection; Congress had "considered proposals for across-the-board
tariffs on China., 30 4 However, China may not necessarily be the main
cause of United States job loss because the "biggest job losses have been
in industries in which America's imports from China are small. 30 5
Commerce has imposed high taxes on the Chinese companies using
the wide discretion afforded to the agency in the statue. While accepting
certain data in investigations, Commerce in other investigations has
rejected the same data. Nevertheless, Commerce's calculation of duties
often stands as long as it can be reasonably explained. Even though
Commerce's determinations fall within the reasonable standard of the
statute, they contravene the statute's purpose, to calculate the values of
the product and in turn the final duty, as accurately as possible. Should
the CIT review standard be stricter, Commerce would need to more
thoroughly explain its findings and the data used for its calculation
beyond a reasonable standard. Such a heightened standard for "best
available information" would ensure process adherence and maintain
credibility with foreign countries in the U.S. antidumping law. In
addition, a clearly delineated statute as to the specific factors that make
supplied information unreliable and permit Commerce to use other

303.

Fairor Foul,supra note 23, at 2.

304. Id. at 95.
305.

The Halo Effect, supra note 236, at 9, 11.
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available data would guide companies in their business planning and
maintain the goal of the statute.
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